Since taking office in 2012, China’s President Xi Jinping has been consolidating his power. He amended the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) constitution, placing him on par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, and proclaimed the party’s supreme role, stating that it leads ‘everything’ in China. In 2018, he abolished term limits for the presidency, removing an obstacle for him to rule for life, and secured a third term as the General Secretary of CCP, securing his position as the most powerful leader of China since Mao.

China’s regime under Xi has become highly centralised and personalised, with Xi cultivating his own power, promoting loyal followers and removing potential challengers. His supporters see the centralised control as a strength that provides stability and continuity, while critics argue that removing dissidents and moderates could leave the government vulnerable to failures, similar to the mismanagement during the COVID-19 pandemic.

While Xi’s changes have led to a more centralised and authoritarian government, they have at the same time accelerated the decline in China-US relations. China has also adopted a more aggressive foreign policy, particularly towards Taiwan, and is working to build its own ‘sphere of influence,’ by offering support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and backing Iran. It will likely use the current international turmoil to establish a coalition of (like-minded) partners, aiming to counterbalance and resist pressure from the US and the broader West.

A brief history – Xi’s consolidation of power

When CCP leadership chose Xi as leader in 2012, they believed he could be easily controlled. However, Xi did not wait long to reveal his authoritarian side. In a speech in December 2012, he dismissed democracy as dangerous and argued that China needed to do whatever it takes to avoid the fate of the Soviet Union that collapsed after the end of its communist system. Since then, Xi has been systematically strengthening his position, including eliminating potential rivals and promoting loyalty. This includes the removal of his predecessor, Hu Jintao, from the closing ceremony of the 2022 congress, and the exclusion of Hu’s associates from the new Politburo Standing Committee.

The confidential US Embassy telegrams published by Wikileaks, from the time before Xi came to power describe him as ‘exceptionally ambitious, confident and focused.’ He was reported to be ‘supremely pragmatic’ and a realist, who is driven by a combination of ambition and ‘self-protection.’ Xi was also said to have a ‘siege mentality’ – similarly to Russia’s President Vladimir Putin – focusing on making China strong because it has been abused and humiliated. This means that Xi’s foreign policy has become increasingly aggressive, supported by the building of a military force designed to back his superpower ambition.

Xi’s consolidation of power has been accompanied by anti-corruption campaigns that are aimed at ensuring discipline and reining in ‘out-of-control’ officials, an initiative initially viewed as short-term. The campaign has been a cornerstone of his strategy and quickly expanded, leading to the investigation and prosecution of thousands, including high-ranking officials, members of security apparatus, top military officers and executives of state-owned and private enterprises. Many of those removed in the recent years were initially viewed as Xi’s protégés, having been promoted to their positions under Xi, in particular within the The People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These purges have sent a clear message that any perceived disloyalty or threat to Xi’s authority will be met with swift action, creating a climate of fear and uncertainty, where party members and military leaders are careful not to express any dissent or opposition to Xi’s ideas and policies.

Many see similarities with historical purges under Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin. Xi’s aim of constructing an image of himself as a strong leader, praised as the ‘pilot at the helm’ who is destined to lead China to prosperity at home and superpower status abroad is also reminiscent of Mao’s traditional title of ‘Great Helmsman.’ Xi has fortified this image by linking it to his concept of ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,’ closely tied to the so-called ‘Chinese Dream.’ The Dream, as defined by Xi, means becoming a fully developed nation by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. Xi’s ‘rejuvenation’ vision encompasses economic development, cultural revival, and enhancing China’s global standing, all aimed at restoring China’s historical greatness. Xi has also linked Taiwan to this vision, stating that China’s complete reunification is essential for ‘national rejuvenation.’

The question of Taiwan

Xi has made it clear that China will not renounce the use of force to achieve reunification with Taiwan. True to this goal, the country appears to be preparing for an invasion, with China’s military budget reaching a record $246 billion in 2025. This includes increased military exercises around Taiwan, modernising the PLA, and developing capabilities such as advanced fighter jets and a powerful navy. China recently deployed new landing barges in the South China Sea, designed to support amphibious assault operations, significantly enhancing its sealift capabilities.

The country has also been building a legal framework to justify the potential invasion of Taiwan, including the Anti-Secession Law that mandates ‘non-peaceful means’ if Taiwan is moving towards independence. Xi has also been leveraging the perceived ambiguity of the US administration’s stance towards Taiwan and uses the so-called ‘grey zone’ strategy aimed at exhausting Taiwan. This includes frequent warplane incursions into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, Chinese ships damaging undersea internet cables around Taiwan, cyberattacks, and propaganda and disinformation campaigns to destabilise and overwhelm the country.

While Xi has emphasised the importance of Taiwan’s reunification, he has not set a specific deadline, despite speculation about a 2027 target date. Even with China conducting its aggressive exercises, an invasion is unlikely in the near future, both due to the risks involved and Xi’s purges. The frequent changes at the PLA’s leadership level have raised concerns about cohesion within the military, as well as questions about the PLA’s true capabilities and effectiveness. Also, while the purges suggest corruption and waste in the military, they have likely affected the PLA’s readiness to fight by removing senior and experienced officers and damaging morale.

Challenges for China in the current geopolitical climate

2024 is said to have been extremely challenging year for China and Xi. China continues to face problems with a shrinking population, weak domestic demand, rising unemployment, damaged business confidence, and decreasing foreign investment. This coincides with an increasingly hostile foreign environment; the US has tightened technological restrictions and will likely begin screening investment in China, which threatens to stall the country’s technological ambitions and economic goals. Xi acknowledged these ‘headwinds’ in his 2025 New Year’s speech, the first time he has mentioned economic challenges in his annual messages since assuming power.

The current year may be even more challenging, as China faces an emboldened President Trump who has long been fixated on the US trade deficit with China, being convinced that the US is being ‘ripped off.’ Trump used this rationale to impose tariffs on Chinese imports, leading to a trade war as China responded with its own tariffs. Although China faces losing an export market because of the trade war, it has vowed to ‘fight to the end.’ The country appears to be confident that it can withstand Trump’s tariffs and might even benefit from them; most of China’s exports to the US are ‘cheap exports’ of goods such as toys, shoes, and clothing, rather than the high-tech reflective of the technological supremacy that China is aiming for. Furthermore, Chinese exports to the US have fallen to just 2.7% to date.

While Xi has stated that China will not back down, the trade war could undermine its export-oriented economic model, and the country will need to find replacement markets. Many countries might consider barriers to cheap Chinese imports – supported by its overcapacity and subsidies. Xi has criticised Trump’s tariffs as ‘unilateral bullying,’ positioning China as a stable trading partner in contrast to the unpredictable US, which it accuses of promoting ‘the law of the jungle.’ China is now urging other countries to join them, highlighting its Belt and Road Initiative and arguing that more than three quarters of the world’s countries have joined it.

At present, China’s leadership is unlikely to back down as Trump’s actions are seen as ‘bullying,’ something historical experience tells them to stand up to. They are also likely to have been right in prioritising self-reliance in recent years. Many analysts in China argue that the so-called ‘Trump shock’ is exactly what the country needs to move to advanced technologies of higher value that would compete directly with the US. This means that China will likely focus on self-reliance in strategic industries, to strengthen its resilience to trade pressure. If the country continues this policy, it will likely be less exposed to the US in 10 to 15 years’ time. This will also mean that it would have less to lose and might consider military action against Taiwan or Philippines less risky.

Furthermore, while Xi has previously criticised what he sees as a US-led campaign of ‘encirclement and suppression,’ the setbacks appear to have only strengthened his resolve. He does not appear to be ready to change course or initiate bold reforms. Instead, he is likely to continue with a policy of persistence alongside reinforcing discipline. For Xi, China’s domestic problems are caused by insufficient ideological discipline and loyalty to his vision, aggravated by enemies, both internal and external. Xi uses this narrative to obscure his inability to deliver progress, but also to justify repression.

Closing thoughts: Domestic and foreign policy approaches in Xi’s China

Xi Jinping has been continuously consolidating his power, with purges a key element of his rule, aimed at ensuring loyalty to him. While these might have seen some success in fighting corruption and may have enforced better control, they have also created an atmosphere of fear and mistrust and raised concerns about an abuse of power. The centralisation of power has limited the autonomy of officials and reduced their incentive for effective governance, and it could also erode competence and hinder entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, they highlight Xi’s determination to maintain absolute control and are likely to continue.

China under Xi will continue to focus on state-led development and has made national security, self-reliance, and technological advancement a top priority. However, the trade war with the US and US limitations on exports, such as semiconductors and advanced technology export controls, will mean significant ‘headwinds.’ In addition, while China’s economic and manufacturing power are formidable, the country’s governing system is also rigid, based on fear, and influenced by party dictatorship characterised by a strong emphasis on personal loyalty. This has created a less predictable and potentially more aggressive regime with a more confrontational foreign policy that could pose challenges to global stability, similar to the approaches taken by Trump’s ‘America First’ and Putin’s ‘multilateral world order,’ with Russia in charge.

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